Children's Fiction About 9/11: Ethnic, Heroic and National Identities

In this study, Lampert examines how cultural identities are constructed within fictional texts for young people written about the attacks on the Twin Towers. It identifi es three significant identity categories encoded in 9/11 books for children:ethnic identities, national identities, and heroic identities,arguing that the identities formed within the selected children’s texts are in flux, privileging performances of identities that are contingent on post-9/11 politics. Looking at texts including picture books, young adult fiction, and a selection of DC Comics, Lampert finds in post-9/11 children’s literature a co-mingling of xenophobia and tolerance; a binaried competition between good and evil and global harmony and national insularity; and a lauding of both the commonplace hero and the super-human. The shifting identities evident in texts that are being produced for children about 9/11 offer implicit and explicit accounts of what constitutes good citizenship, loyalty to nation and community, and desirable attributes in a Western post-9/11 context. This book makes an original contribution to the field of children’s literature by providing a focused and sustained analysis of how texts for children about 9/11 contribute to formations of identity in these complex times of cultural unease and global unrest.

Towards national identities: Welsh theatres

Williams, Ioan. 'Towards national identities: Welsh theatres', In: The Cambridge History of British Theatre, (Eds) Kershaw, Baz., Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.242-272 RAE2008

Sovereignty, Article 4(2) TEU and the Respect of National Identities: Swinging the Balance of Power in Favour of the Member States?

The question of whether and to what extent sovereignty has been transferred to the European Union (EU) from its Member States remains a central debate within the EU and is interlinked with issues such as Kompetenz-Kompetenz, direct effect and primacy. Central to any claim to sovereignty is the principle of primacy, which requires that Member States uphold EU law over national law where there is a conflict. However, limitations to primacy can traditionally be found in national jurisprudence and the Maastricht Treaty introduced a possible EU limitation with the requirement that the EU respect national identities of Member States. The Lisbon Treaty provided only minimal further support to the principle of primacy whilst simultaneously developing the provision on national identities, now found within Article 4(2) TEU. There are indications from the literature, national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the EU that the provision is gathering strength as a legal tool and is likely to have a wider scope than the text might indicate. In its new role, Article 4(2) TEU bolsters the Member States’ claim to sovereignty and the possibility to uphold aspects crucial to them in conflict with EU law and the principle of primacy. Consequently, it is central to the relationship between the constitutional courts of the Member States and the CJEU, and where the final elements of control remain in ‘hard cases’. However, it does so as part of EU law, thereby facilitating the evasion of direct fundamental conflicts and reflecting the concept of constitutional pluralism.

The Shifting Battleground of Article 4(2) TEU: Evolving National Identities and the corresponding need for EU management?

Article 4(2) TEU requires that the European Union (EU) respect the Member States’ national identities, creating a legal obligation enforceable before the CJEU and valuable in political negotiations. However, the concept of national identities is unclear, leaving open questions about the scope or parameters of the provision and its applicability. The CJEU appears likely to take a relatively flexible approach in light of Article 4(2) TEU’s relationship with national constitutional courts’ reserves. This flexible approach would enable Member States to rely upon a range of aspects as part of their national identity, including ones that were previously unidentified. This is a crucial feature if one considers that national identities may evolve gradually or even dramatically, including where Member States purposefully attempt to develop their national identities further. This possibility of an evolved national identity is exemplified by the French Charte de l’Environnement. It may thereby be possible for Member States to stretch the scope and application of Article 4(2) TEU through reference to these evolving national identities. This potential raises significant challenges for the EU regarding the management of Article 4(2) TEU, which it will need to address if it wishes to ensure harmonisation and uniformity in the relevant areas.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.